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In recent times, use of market-based instruments to facilitate enhanced protection or 
production of ecosystem services has achieved a high public profile.  However, much 
work remains to apply these tools in practice.  Particular issues include definition and 
measurement of ecosystem services, development of institutions and mechanisms to 
facilitate trade and integration of these instruments into the broader natural resource 
management agenda and toolbox.  In this paper these issues are explored with respect 
to pilot markets for ecosystem services in three case study catchments.  Emphasis is 
placed on pilot selection rationale and identification of key facilitative mechanisms 
and institutions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Ecosystems provide many ‘services’ from which humans benefit.  Recent research 
undertaken by the Ecosystem Services Project at CSIRO has identified the importance 
of these values generated to Australian communities.  However, the systems 
generating many ecosystem services are degraded, poorly managed or subject to a 
variety of threats resulting in a reduction in our quality of life or increased production 
costs.  Most ecosystem services are public goods within the current institutional 
structure and thus cannot be bought or sold.  As a result there are few incentives for 
landowners to invest in their production and maintenance. 
 
As with other public goods, a traditional response has been to turn to governments for 
continued supply of ecosystem services through regulation, cost sharing and other 
mechanisms driven by government redistribution of resources.  However, the same 
issues that make many ecosystem services public goods mean that many of the 
services are not easily amenable to prescriptive regulatory approaches.  These issues 
include how to define and measure property rights, monitor outcomes and design 
regulations or exchange mechanisms to achieve these outcomes.  Moreover, the roles 
and values of ecosystem services are context dependent, varying from place to place, 
and monitoring is expensive.  Given the difficulties governments face in ensuring 
production of ecosystem services, and the importance of ecosystem services, many 
policy alternatives should be examined.  One option is to explore the use of market-
based instruments (MBIs). 
 
Markets are used to supply many essential items in our lives including food, clothing 
and shelter and are the mechanism by which landowners are rewarded when their land 
produces valuable ecosystem goods such as food and fibre products (even when their 
production reduces the production of other ecosystem services such as water quality 
protection).  Markets work well at providing rewards – and markets for ecosystem 
services may prove to be one way of rewarding and encouraging land managers to 
protect and produce ecosystem services. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  In the next section a definition of ecosystem 
services is provided together with further discussion of the policy context and 
research problem.  The third part of the paper is focused on the economic concepts 
that frame consideration of MBIs.  The development and application of a framework 
for applying the theoretical concepts within a regional case study context is described 
in section four.  The resultant ‘best bet’ market opportunities for the ‘Markets for 
Ecosystem Services’ project are briefly described in the fifth part of the paper.  A set 
of conclusions drawn from the preliminary application of these processes is 
summarised in the final part of the paper along with an overview of future research. 
2.  Background 
2.1  What are Ecosystem Services? 
 
The importance of ecosystem services goes back to the time of Plato and likely well 
before that.  Only recently, however, has the concept gained traction with the broader 
research, policy and natural resource management community.  An ‘ecosystem’ is  
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defined as the array of organisms, found in a definable space where interactions 
among the organisms and with their non-living surroundings take place (Heal et.al. 
2001).  A potted plant, a paddock and a rainforest are all examples of ecosystems in 
different places and at different spatial scales.  Interactions amongst system 
components produce outputs, many of which are inputs to other ecosystems and 
beneficial to humans.  The concept of services literally means doing work for the 
direct or indirect benefit of another; or transformations of raw products into products 
of greater value (Binning et.al. 2001).
 1   
 
Ecosystem services represent the transformations of natural assets (soil, water, biota) 
into ‘products’ of value to humans.  A widely accepted definition of ecosystem 
services is “the conditions and processes through which ecosystems, and the species 
that make them up, sustain and fulfil human life” (Daily 1997 p.3).  While the 
anthropocentric nature of ecosystem services may seem arrogant, it is this explicit 
emphasis on benefits to humans that helps to identify their importance in a policy 
context.  Examples of important ecosystem services in Australia include:  
·  provision of clean water; 
·  maintenance of liveable climates and atmospheres (carbon sequestration); 
·  pollination of crops and native vegetation; 
·  fulfilment of people’s cultural, spiritual, intellectual needs; and, 
·  provision of options for the future, for example though the maintenance of 
biodiversity. 
 
The fact that ecosystems are continually in flux complicates the identification and 
management of an optimal ecosystem (as perceived by humans).  It can also be 
difficult to identify the scale at which one considers ecosystem services.  For example, 
interactions between bacteria and minerals contribute to the development of soil (local 
scale), while plants photosynthesising the suns rays help to maintain the atmosphere 
within limits tolerable by humans (planet scale).  To help address this issue, various 
researchers around the world have provided classifications of ecosystem services.  
(Daily 1997) provides a widely accepted classification that has been adapted and 
applied by researchers in Australia (See Box 1).  As the scale or breadth at which an 
ecosystem is analysed narrows, the number of interactions and resulting emergent 
properties and outputs are reduced, thus simplifying analysis. 
 
Box 1: The Ecosystem Services Project  
The Ecosystem Services Project was instigated in 1999 by CSIRO with funding from 
The Myer Foundation.  The goal was to ‘change Australia’s thinking about natural 
resource management’.  The goal is being achieved through: increasing awareness and 
understanding of ecosystem services amongst decision makers and society in general; 
exploring the economic and other values of ecosystem services in natural resource 
management; and, investigating possible mechanisms and new institutional 
arrangements that better recognise, use and protect ecosystem services. 
 
                                                 
1 Despite the acceptance of ecosystem services being based on the economic concept of services they 
are not equivalent.  Services in an economic concept generate direct values to recipients – for example, 
a lawn mowing business.  However, ecosystem services are the transformations or processing of raw 
products by ecosystems that may eventually lead to an outcome of value to humans.  
Whitten, Salzman, Shelton and Proctor (2003) Markets for Ecosystem Services: Applying the Concepts 
4 
The Ecosystem Services Project (due for completion in mid 2003) involves 
collaborators and participants from all over Australia, and international collaborators 
from around the World, and consists of four main elements. Taking a case study 
approach, the process involves: 
·  conducting a semi-quantitative ‘inventory’ of the full range of ecosystem services 
present in an area, a catchment for example, and ranking their relative importance; 
·  identifying a set of plausible future scenarios closely tied to real decisions and 
challenges facing decision makers; 
·  completing quantitative and qualitative economic and ecological analysis of the 
various scenarios and their impacts on key ecosystem services identified in the 
inventory; and, 
·  analysing the institutional arrangements and beginning the process of exploring 
new institutions for protecting and securing greater value from ecosystems.  
For more information see: www.ecosystemservicesproject.org 
 
2.2  The policy context and research problem 
 
Given their significance, one might expect that ecosystem services would be prized by 
markets and explicitly protected by the law.  With few exceptions, however, neither 
has been the case.  Despite their obvious importance to our wellbeing, ecosystem 
services have largely been ignored in both domestic and international law and policy.  
Ironically, our major environmental laws’ inability to protect ecosystems is 
intentional, for protection of ecosystems was not a primary objective when the laws 
were drafted.  For example, pollution laws generally rely on human health-based 
standards (focusing on pollutant levels in air or water).  Conservation laws are either 
species-specific or must accommodate multiple and conflicting resource uses.  Of 
course, parts of these laws, such as restrictions on clearing native vegetation, clearly 
can conserve ecosystem services.  The point, though, is that these laws were not 
primarily intended to provide legal standards for conservation of natural capital and 
the services that flow from it and, in practice, they usually do not.  
 
While specialised governmental institutions do pay attention to many services 
provided by ecosystems, their focus is primarily on the provision of these services 
through extensive modification of the landscape or construction of specialised 
facilities – that is, through ‘built structures’ rather than managed landscapes.  For 
example, local officials have historically built dikes and levees to minimise flood 
damage rather than provide the same service through protecting or restoring wetlands.  
Water suppliers have generally built purification plants rather than conserve and 
restore forested watersheds.  With the growing recognition of the threats posed by 
dryland salinity, greater attention is now being paid to the role of vegetation in 
regulating water table levels, but in many respects this is the exception that proves the 
rule.   
 
Why has so little political attention been paid to conservation and protection of 
ecosystem services?  The main reason is that the value of natural capital is 
unrecognized by most people.  The carbon cycle, the role of wetlands as fishery 
nurseries, and countless other benefits provided by the natural environment are taken 
for granted.  Even when recognised, ecosystem services tend to be ignored by policy-
makers because historically they could be.  They have been ‘free’.  Markets explicitly 
value and place dollar figures on ‘ecosystem goods’ (such as timber) that are  
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perceived as important and limited in supply.  Yet the services underpinning the 
production of these goods (such as soil maintenance and nutrient recycling) almost 
without exception have no market value – not because they are worthless or because 
their interruption is cost-free, but rather, because there is no market to capture and 
express their value directly.  Until fairly recently, they were so abundant relative to 
human demands that such markets were not needed.  As a result, no efficient price 
mechanisms exist to signal scarcity or deterioration of most ecosystem services.  In 
economic terms, they are classic public goods. Their use cannot be exclusively 
controlled.   
 
In some cases, it should be noted, built provision of services will prove a preferable 
delivery strategy, providing greater social benefits at a lower cost than investing in 
natural capital.  In other instances, however, the net value of the joint products yielded 
by ecosystems will exceed that of built structures.  The joint products of a wetland, for 
instance, can include flood control, water purification, recreation, scenic beauty, and 
habitat conservation.  Yet with rare exception, local, state, and national governments 
simply do not consider ecosystems as valuable providers of services.  Without explicit 
comparisons between natural and built provision of services, we will continue to miss 
opportunities where reliance on natural capital provides the lowest cost services for 
human welfare.   
 
Despite the promise of investing in natural capital, there are key challenges that 
remain.  We must develop robust methodologies for the valuation of services.  
Without these, how can we compare the costs of degrading an ecosystem and its 
service provision with the benefits of the offending activity?  If ecosystem services 
have real but uncaptured value, what are the necessary conditions for market creation 
to exchange valuable services?  And, critically, is the science good enough to tell us 
how to manage ecosystems for reliable service provision?  The focus in this paper is 
on the conditions for market creation including whether sufficient scientific 
information is available. 
 
In considering the practical implications of an ecosystem services approach, the key 
point to keep in mind is that land planners make decisions at the margins.  While 
press reports have trumpeted the immense value of ecosystem services (up to $33 
trillion for the globe) (Costanza et.al. 1997), such calculations are largely irrelevant to 
decision makers.  Few policy decisions, thankfully, will involve obliterating an 
ecosystem service.  Rather, such decisions are incremental.  Where, along the 
continuum of development, land use, and pollution impacts are ecosystem services 
degraded and by how much?  Given the complexity of ecosystem services, the 
responses are almost certainly non-linear.  But local and regional officials must act on 
planning requests; it is no good to refuse to grant permits because we need more 
information.  For example, what are the impacts of allowing 50 hectares to be cleared 
rather than 10 or 100 hectares?  What are the impacts, instead, of clearing 50 hectares 
25 kilometres away?  Indeed regional land managers in Australia have been asked 
these or similar questions at a broad scale as part of the development of regional 
natural resource management plans.  If, as is generally the case, we cannot provide 
robust answers to these important questions, then reliance on markets may provide a 
useful means to proceed where the can be designed to reflect community demands.  
Hence, the primary focus in addressing the potential for market creation is at the 
regional level where many of these decisions are being made.  
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3.  Conceptual framework 
 
Answers to questions about the research problem – namely the conditions for market 
creation including the level of scientific information required – should draw on and be 
embedded in a strong theoretical context.  In this section such a conceptual framework 
is developed.  The dominant paradigm drawn on is the field of new institutional 
economics.
2  It is assumed throughout this section that the community would derive a 
net benefit from increased production of ecosystem services.  Thus the most important 
underpinning economic concept driving policy consideration is comparison of the 
alternative policy options to achieve.  As will be shown, this decisions hinges on the 
transaction costs of the alternative policy options including MBIs, regulation and 
doing nothing. 
 
The section is structured as follows.  Initially a definition of essential terms is 
provided including property rights, markets and market-based instruments, and 
transaction costs.  In the second part of this section a conceptual framework for the 
application of transaction cost concepts to MBIs is developed.  This discussion is 
focused on the fixed and variable costs of setting up a market and the nature of the 
trade-offs between market scope and transaction costs.  Two key interrelated areas for 
MBIs are definition and measurement of ecosystem services and development of 
structures and mechanisms to facilitate trade.  These are discussed in more detail in 
the final part of this section. 
 




Property rights over the ecosystem service(s) to be traded form a pre-requisite to 
market exchange.  Property rights are defined as “a claim to a benefit (or income) 
stream that the State will agree to protect through the assignment of duty to others 
who may covet, or somehow interfere with, the benefit stream” (Bromley 1991 p. 2).  
Barzel (1997 p. 3) provides an identical, albeit refocused, definition based on the 
degree of protection afforded the property right holder: “the individual’s ability, in 
expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset) directly or to 
consume it indirectly through exchange.”  That is, the stronger the property rights, the 
larger the proportion of the benefit stream the individual can access and potentially 
trade. 
 
To be effective, property rights must be excludable, divisible (in both space and 
scope), and alienable (or transferable) (Kasper and Streit 1998).  Well-defined 
property rights can reduce transaction costs by clearly defining benefit streams thus 
facilitating reduced negotiation costs over the extent of rights and correlated duties 
(Binning and Young 1997).  Property right conditions are further discussed in Section 
3.2. 
 
                                                 
2 Particularly useful references in this field include Williamson (1985, 1998), Coase (1937, 1960) and 
North (1992) among others.  
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Markets and market based instruments 
 
A market is defined as is the bringing together of a buyer and a seller so that they can 
voluntarily trade property rights.  The simplest of markets involves a bartering system 
while more sophisticated markets have prices and monetary exchanges.  A negotiated 
exchange between a buyer and seller reveals a price for the commodity.  This simple 
definition reflects the broad diversity of market structures that can exist and can be 
applied to a market for ecosystem services.  Some important market types are 
described in Box 2.  The strengths and weaknesses of alternative market structures 
will differ according to the characteristics of the ecosystem commodity being traded 
and the degree of market power that can be exercised by a single participant or small 
group of participants. 
 
Box 2: Basic market characteristics 
Some market types 
Monopoly: One seller and many buyers.  The single seller may be able to exert 
market power to discriminate between buyers. 
Freely competitive market: many buyers and sellers none of whom are able to 
exercise market power alone or in combination. 
Monopsony: One buyer and many sellers.  The single buyer may be able to exert 
market power to discriminate between sellers. 
 
Transaction characteristics (following Murtough, Aretino and Matysek 2002) 
Non-tradeable: The property right can only be exchanged once within a specified 
time period. 
Tradeable: Property rights may be repeatedly exchanged unless they are exhausted or 
otherwise consumed. 
No-offsets: A specified total quantity of property rights is defined and allocated that 
may then be traded according to the rules of the market. 
Offsets: Additional units (and thus property rights to those units) can be created by 
the actions of ecosystem managers according to specified rules.  These units are 
then available for use within the rules of the market. 
 
Market-based instruments are broadly defined as mechanisms within which property 
rights are voluntarily exchanged, generally using a monetary numeraire, and in which 
participants may be differentiated between according to the property rights exchanged 
or the monetary payment or both.  They are intended to achieve behavioural change in 
a flexible manner avoiding use of prescribed behaviour or technology (National 
Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAPSWQ) 2002).  They are generally 





Allocation of property rights to ecosystem services facilitates the basis for exchange 
in markets.  Assuming no costs of exchange, the final outcome of exchange is not 
dependent on the initial ownership of the property rights and full information will be 
revealed through trades (Coase 1960).  However, the assumption of no costs of 
exchange is not tenable and transaction costs are pervasive in market institutions.  
Transaction costs can be defined as those costs that are attributable to:  
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i.  codifying property rights, and identifying and enforcing ownership over 
property rights; 
ii.  seeking out buyers or sellers of property rights; 
iii. negotiating a sale; 
iv. measuring the quality and quantity of goods; and, 
v.  contracting specifications about the transfer of property rights.  Contracting 
issues include when delivery will occur and the uncertainty about any 
intervening period and incomplete aspects of the contract.   
 
Transaction costs are important because they consume resources that could be used 
for other purposes (Wills 1997).  The concept of transaction costs is embedded within 
the new institutional economics.   
 
3.2  Underpinning economic concepts 
 
The initial step in policy development is to establish the goal of the policy.  As 
indicated in the introduction it is implicitly assumed that the policy goal is to increase 
the production of specified ecosystem services.  Only once the policy goal is 
established that can one assess the most efficient means of achieving it.  The concept 
of transaction costs is vital to understanding the efficiency tradeoffs in considering the 
potential development of markets for ecosystem services.  Markets for ecosystem 
services will generate net benefits to the community (over alternative measures) 
where their transaction costs are lower than existing mechanisms or the additional 
ecosystem services supplied outweigh the full costs of provision.
3  The concept of 
transaction costs is most commonly applied to the ongoing variable or marginal 
transaction costs associated with market exchanges.  For example, the search, time 
and administrative costs associated with purchasing a property at auction.  However, a 
major obstacle to developing markets for ecosystem services are the fixed or set-up 
costs associated with establishing a market for a new commodity.   
 
Fixed or set-up costs of markets 
 
Fixed or up-front transaction costs are primarily those associated with designing and 
setting-up institutions and organisations that facilitate a market.  Fixed institutional 
transaction costs relate to the gathering of information, definition of a property rights 
framework and design of exchange institutions (through contract law or enactment of 
legislation).  Fixed organisational or bureaucratic transaction costs are those incurred 
in setting up structures to manage and monitor market exchanges. 
 
A set of desirable property right and exchange institution characteristics for creating 
markets for ecosystem services developed by Murtough, Aretino and Matysek (2002) 
is shown in Table 3.1.  Potential market participants will incur additional set-up costs 
not defined in Table 3.1 in developing the required physical and intellectual 
infrastructure to participate in the market.  In many cases the costs of defining, 
verifying and enforcing property rights will be prohibitive under current technologies 
                                                 
3 Government and the private sector incur transaction costs.  Government transaction costs comprise of 
information gathering, legislation actions, and implementation and administration through the 
bureaucracy.  Private sector costs comprise direct fees or charges and costs involved in protecting and 
exchanging property rights.  Future costs under alternative policies may be strongly influenced by the 
dynamic attributes that facilitate or restrict innovation.  
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and thus markets will fail due to high property right transaction costs.  For example, 
the costs involved in defining and enforcing property rights associated with the role of 
vegetation management in regulating water tables have proven too high to date.  In 
other cases additional transaction costs introduced by uncertainty, difficulty in 
identifying buyers and sellers and in exchanging the property right separately from 
other bundles may induce market failure.  For example, who benefits from flood 
mitigation?  How can flood mitigation be defined as a property right and exchanged 
separately from other land management property rights? 
 
The fixed transaction costs associated with markets for ecosystem services are in a 
sense costs associated with providing a public good.  This is because many fixed 
transaction costs are incurred in developing institutional and organisational structures 
that are non-rival or which have low or negligible marginal costs associated with their 
use by additional market participants.  Therefore, while it may be theoretically 
possible for potential market participants to define property rights and exchange 
mechanisms using existing institutions (such as contract law) the upfront costs are 
likely to outweigh individual benefits. 
 
Table 3.1: Desirable institutional characteristics for creating markets 
Characteristic  Description 
1. Clearly defined  Nature and extent of the property right is unambiguous 
2. Verifiable  Use of the property right can be measured at reasonable cost. 
3. Enforceable  Ownership of the property right can be enforced at reasonable 
cost. 
4. Valuable  There are parties who are willing to purchase the property right. 
5. Transferable  Ownership of the property right can be transferred to another 
party at reasonable cost. 
6. Low scientific 
uncertainty
a 
Use of the property right has a clear relationship with 
ecosystem services. 
7. Low sovereign 
risk
a 
Future government decisions are unlikely to significantly 
reduce the property right’s value 
a   Low in the sense that it does not prevent a market from forming.  Moderate levels of risk and 
uncertainty are not necessarily insurmountable barriers to the operation of a market. 
Source: Murtough, Aretino and Matysek (2002) Table 2, p. xii 
 
Variable or on-going costs of markets 
 
Markets for ecosystem services are subject to the same range of on-going or variable 
transaction costs as other markets including search, negotiation and contracting costs.  
Variable transaction costs are the additional transaction costs incurred in each market 
exchange.  To some extent fixed and variable costs may be traded off.  Higher fixed 
costs can reduce search, negotiation and contracting costs through improved property 
right definition and more efficient market exchanges.  However, higher fixed costs 
may also raise the cost of market entry and thus reduce the number of participants and 
transactions thus raising the average transaction cost per unit exchanged.   
 
Brokers or agencies may reduce the variable transaction costs in markets through 
specialisation and economies of scale across multiple exchanges in both scale and 
scope (see for example Binning et.al. 2002).  As an example consider the role played 
by land trusts who effectively broker their donors demands to purchase conservation  
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covenants over sub-sets of the ecosystem services provided by forests in the United 
States of America.
4  Other mechanisms can also be employed to reduce variable 
transaction costs such as standardised contracts and measurement systems and agreed 
meeting places for buyers and sellers (which may be physical or electronic).   
 
Bundling ecosystem services and transaction costs 
 
The concept of ecosystem services encompasses the full range of outputs from which 
people benefit (as discussed in Section 2.1).  A common misconception is that 
markets for ecosystem services should correspondingly encompass the full range of 
ecosystem services because such services are jointly produced.  However, this fails to 
take into account the relationship between the marginal benefits and marginal costs 
(including transaction costs) of including an additional commodity within a single 
market structure.  In some senses this is a discussion of the relationship between the 
completeness of property right definitions and relative market efficiency. 
 
Figure 3.1:Possible relationships between costs and benefits of markets  
 
This concept is demonstrated in Figure 3.1.  For a given joint production function (not 
shown), the measurement and inclusion of additional benefits is likely to increase the 
total benefit to society at a decreasing rate such as demonstrated by the benefit curve 
‘B’.  Two possible cost functions associated with including additional benefits within 
a single market mechanism are shown as ‘C1’ and ‘C2’.  For simplicity the optimal 
number of ecosystem services included within the market is ‘x’ in each case 
delivering a net benefit ‘y’.  Only if the net benefits (‘y’) were maximised at the 
maximum number of ecosystem services (‘Max’) would all services be included.  
Furthermore, the net benefits may well be higher if the services were marketed in 
separate markets.  This would be dependent on management flexibility to change the 
                                                 
4 These deals have involved easements that eliminate logging as well as those that change management 
practices to ensure ecosystem services are protected.  See for example the New England Forestry 
Foundation at http://www.newenglandforestry.org/home/index.asp.  
x 






C2  C1 
{  y  
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jointly produced output mix and the additional transaction costs incurred in separate 
markets versus the costs of brokering buyers together within a single market.  
 
3.3  Commodity definition, measurement and internalisation 
mechanisms 
 
Definition and measurement of ecosystem services 
 
A basic question in all MBIs, though often too obvious to be asked, is very simple – 
what is actually being exchanged?  If one considers cap-and-trade programs, for 
example, they all seem to share a basic feature.  CFC, fisheries, and proposed 
greenhouse gas trading programs, for example, all exchange commodities that appear 
to be fungible.  One molecule of CFC, kilo of halibut, or ton of carbon dioxide seems 
much the same as another, both in terms of identity and impact.  Thus environmental 
markets are considered a type of commodity market, where environmental credits go 
to the highest bidder.  Indeed environmental markets must assume fungibility – that 
the things exchanged are sufficiently similar in ways important to the goals of 
environmental protection – otherwise there would be no assurance that trading 
ensured environmental protection.  While the precondition of fungibility may seem 
self-evident, this core assumption turns out to be problematic.  
 
As an example of why fungibility matters, consider wetlands mitigation banking in 
the United States. This policy permits developers, once they have taken steps to avoid 
and minimize wetland loss, to compensate for wetlands that will be destroyed through 
development by ensuring the restoration of wetlands in another location.  The 
regulations mandate trades that ensure equivalent value and function between 
destroyed and restored wetlands.  In practice, however, most trades are valued in units 
of acreage.  Within very loose guidelines, trades between productive (though soon to 
be destroyed) wetlands and restored wetlands are approved on an acre-for-acre basis.  
More sophisticated banks require ratios, trading development on one acre of 
productive wetlands for, say, restoring four or five acres of wetlands somewhere else.  
Counting acres may make for easy accounting, but it is poor policy.  
 
Why?  The social value of the habitat is absent from the transaction.  The ecosystem 
services provided by the wetlands – positive externalities such as water purification, 
groundwater recharge, and flood control – are largely ignored.  Trading acres for acres 
provides an inadequate measure to capture the significance of what is really being 
traded.  To be sure, such a simple metric allows trades, but other important, 
unaccounted trade-offs are occurring.  The program can suffer from a lack of 
accountability (or, more accurately, a lack of countability).  
 
In fact, upon close inspection, it turns out that most environmental markets involve 
commodities and trades that exhibit a range of fungibilities.  To achieve the optimal 
outcome from MBIs, we need to understand and account much better for the qualities 
being traded.  To do so requires careful consideration of the measure of exchange – 
the currency – since in the final analysis the currency forms the very basis of the 
transaction.  The trading currency superficially makes the commodities fungible, 
determining what is being traded/purchased and, therefore, protected.  
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Definition and measurement of ecosystem services (also known as ‘currency 
adequacy’) is an inescapable aspect of implementing any MBI.  In paying farmers for 
the service of evapotranspiration (i.e. for planting trees to lower the water table and 
reduce soil salinity), for example, should the proper measure for payment be trees 
planted, water released by the vegetation, reduction in water table level, or soil 
salinity?  While each of these measures is relevant, they send different signals to the 
farmer.  Thus project design must carefully consider selection of the currency unit – 
and determine whether the metric can capture the significant values exchanged or 




Assuming one can adequately define and measure the ecosystem service in a fungible 
currency, how can this be incorporated within a market-based framework?  A broad 
overview of the mechanisms that have been used to increase the internalisation of 
ecosystem service benefits is provided in Table 3.2.  These do not describe the full 
range of potential mechanisms for creating MBIs with the characteristics described in 
Table 3.1 and actual schemes in operation may involve combinations of differing 
mechanisms (with higher resultant transaction costs but potentially increased 
flexibility).  For example, a cap and trade mechanism may also permit creation of 
additional credits through mitigating offset arrangements.  While taxes and subsidies 
are considered MBIs they are not further discussed in this paper. 
 
Table 3.2: Potential market-based internalisation mechanisms 
Market mechanism  Description 
Transferable permits (new or improved property right definition) 
Baseline and credit or 
offset schemes 
Credits are created by the difference between agreed 
performance (which may be the status quo) and actual 
performance.  These schemes are generally non-tradeable in 
the sense that any created credits can only be sold once.  One 
example is development offsets such as wetland mitigation 
banking. 
Cap and trade  A total number of permits are allocated specifying the right 
to a particular action over a specified time period.  These 
permits are generally tradeable subject to the rules of transfer 
in the market.  One example is the Hunter River Salinity 
Scheme in NSW.  These schemes can also be applied to 
consumptive use of natural resources in which case they are 
often termed usage or abstraction rights. 
Reducing transaction costs in markets 
Lower administrative 
burden 
Many production systems are highly regulated with the goal 
of reducing the impacts of externalities.  Unfortunately in 
some cases this can also have the impact of significantly 
increasing transaction costs associated with creating a 
market.  An example is the administrative burden involved in 
placing a conservation covenant over parts of land units. 
Improve information 
flows 
Environmental Management Schemes (EMS) and eco-
labelling schemes are designed in part to supply additional 
product information with the goal of including the ecosystem 
services impacts of production.  For example, labelling on  
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Banrock Station Wines is designed to market the benign 




Many ecosystem service markets are subject to high 
transaction costs that may be reduced by specialised 
brokerage services.  An example is the revolving fund 
operated by the Victorian Trust for Nature that seeks to link 
buyers and sellers of properties supplying high levels of 
some ecosystem services. 
Directly influencing market outcomes 
Taxes and Subsidies  Taxes and subsidies act by directly altering the prices of 
goods and service in markets through payments to or from 
government.  For example, solid waste charges and load-
based licensing schemes operated by the New South Wales 
(NSW) Environment Protection Agency. 
Extended property rights   
Liability provisions  In some cases liability provisions may be extended to ensure 
protection of ecosystem services either directly or indirectly.  
One example is mining reclamation bonds held until mine 
sites are fully restored.  A related example is deposit refund 
schemes where they are linked to product life-cycle liability 
provisions. 
Note: The division between mechanisms broadly follows that used by the National Market-Based 
Instruments Pilots Program. 
Sources: Godard (2001), Hockenstein, Stavins and Whitehead (1997) and Murtough, Aretino and 
Matysek (2002).  
 
MBI implementation mechanisms vary considerably depending on the extent of 
change from the existing regime.  While this issue is further discussed in Section 4 
three areas are briefly mentioned in the remainder of this section: allocation 
mechanisms, exchange mechanisms and flexibility issues.   
 
Where new property rights are created through transferable permit mechanisms an 
issue of how to allocate these property rights arises because of equity considerations 
and the impact of transaction costs.
5  As a general rule, the equity-based arguments 
for granting property rights based on existing use strengthen as the mechanism moves 
from new property rights over previously unknown commodities through definition of 
open access rights towards de-facto property rights and common property.   
 
The nature of the exchange institution is important because alternative institutional 
structures may reduce the scale of some transaction costs and thus potential sources of 
market failure.  As an example consider the Victorian Bushtender program.  The 
potential market for biodiversity conservation suffers from two major problems: 
spatial heterogeneity of outcomes; and, asymmetric information about conservation 
costs.  Use of an auction mechanism with appropriate information support provides 
incentives to potential participants to reveal information about conservation costs.  
Transaction costs are also reduced by limiting complete measurement and prediction 
of conservation outcomes to a subset of submitted bids.   
                                                 
5 Transaction costs are important because they change the outcome and welfare consequences 
compared to a no transaction costs environment.  
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The efficiency dividend that is sought through use of MBIs primarily results from 
increased flexibility in achieving the desired policy outcome.  Increased flexibility can 
take three forms: technological, spatial and temporal flexibility.  Technological 
flexibility relates to the nature of the mechanisms that comply with the rules of the 
particular MBI.  Spatial flexibility can be restricted while retaining some MBI 
benefits through the use of regional ceilings (termed ‘bubbles’) that require 
compliance with a regional ceiling as well as with an aggregate MBI outcome.  
Temporal flexibility at the individual scale can be achieved through use of banking 
and borrowing procedures and at the aggregate level through development of futures 
exchanges in conjunction with other market mechanisms.  The potential importance of 
these mechanisms for reducing transaction costs is an important consideration in 
mechanism design. 
 
4.  A framework for applying the concepts 
 
As previously described, our goal is to apply the MBI conceptual framework to 
potential policy applications at the regional level.  The focus in the first part of the 
section is on identifying potential MBI policy targets at a regional level.  In the 
remaining two parts the focus is on selection of appropriate policy options given 
existing regulatory frameworks and geographical, political and capacity constraints.  
Combining these aspects produces a MBI opportunity matrix that completes the 
section. 
 
4.1  Community values and MBI policy opportunities 
 
The concept of ecosystem services is based on the benefits generated to humans.  This 
principle also underpins MBIs because market mechanisms can only function where 
there are potential gains from trade.  Put simply: no value then no trades and no 
possible MBI.  Incorporating the concept of transaction costs generates the conclusion 
that trades will only occur where the value of the relevant ecosystem service 
outweighs the transaction costs incurred in the market process.  Thus MBIs are only a 
practical option where ecosystem services generate sufficient values to encourage 
trade and where transaction costs can be sufficiently minimised to facilitate market 
exchange.  The potential for MBIs is thus likely to be maximised where the 
recognised values associated with ecosystem services are highest.  This approach is 
sometimes referred to as ‘picking the low hanging fruit’.  However, this approach also 
has other advantages in that the lessons learnt in developing appropriate MBIs for 
these ecosystem services may reduce the fixed transaction costs associated with MBIs 
for less valued or widely appreciated ecosystem services.   
 
What is needed is a method for identifying the ‘low hanging fruit’.  Ideally the 
method would involve a bio-economic modelling procedure that would estimate the 
scale of benefits from increasing the provision of the relevant ecosystem service(s) 
and comparing these to the costs of production.  Ecosystem services that are likely to 
generate the highest benefits to the community could then be selected for further 
research.  However, such an approach is costly in terms of the time and other 
resources consumed.  This approach may be avoided where communities have already  
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identified priority ecosystem services using other decision mechanisms.
6  For 
example, most regional communities in Australia, particularly target regions under the 
NAPSWQ, have undertaken extensive natural resource management planning 
processes.  Others have even more extensive information resources as the result of 
compiling an ecosystem services inventory.
7  The outputs from these processes 
include targets for a wide range of outcomes that are provided by continued or 
increased production of ecosystem services.  These targets are a starting point for 
identifying potential MBI opportunities at the regional level. 
 
4.2  Policy options and nature of policy problem 
 
Policy is not implemented in a vacuum.  No policy instrument or reform is truly ‘new’ 
since it must be superimposed over existing rules, regulations and customs.  Thus in 
crafting policy instruments, it is helpful to think of them as complementing the status 
quo.  One must consider not only the proposed policy instrument  (e.g., a cap-and-
trade pollution market) but the current state of affairs, as well, for this will dictate the 
policy opportunities.  In this paper the status quo refers to the existing regulatory 
environment.   
 
To make this clearer, think of policy instruments operating along two axes – 
increasing market intervention and increasing regulatory intervention.  In this context 
(depicted in Figure 4.1), one can identify four archetypal cases, each of which 
suggests different policy opportunities. 
 
Figure 4.1: Relationship between regulation and market interventions 
 
Open access: This situation is found in the bottom left of Figure 4.1, and represents 
the case of minimal market and regulatory intervention.  Think of an open access 
ocean fishery where fishers can harvest as many fish as they are able, or groundwater, 
or oil.  This is often known as the setting for the ‘tragedy of the commons’, where 
ever-increasing pressure on the resource will eventually lead to its over-use.  A full 
                                                 
6 Using the output from other decision mechanisms may carry costs because less information is 
available about the nature, scale and distribution of the values generated to the community. 
7 See for example Binning et.al. (2001) for the Goulburn-Broken Catchment in Victoria. 
 
Open Access, 
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range of policy instruments can be used to address this problem, ranging from direct 
government regulation (e.g., restricting fishing capital) and taxes (per boat) to 
property rights (fencing the resource to facilitate individual management) and markets 
(creating tradeable rights to fish). 
 
Prescriptive regulation: This category is found in the lower right part of Figure 4.1, 
and is characterized by government rules that set out what, when, and how much of an 
activity a regulated party is allowed to undertake.  Sometimes called ‘command-and-
control regulation’, this approach can always include more regulation, but often at a 
cost of efficiency.  It can also be coupled with taxes and subsidies (such as load based 
licensing in NSW) or form the basis for an environmental trading market (moving to 
the upper right of the graph). 
 
Tax/Subsidy: This policy approach is found in the upper left of Figure 4.1, where 
behaviour is modified by direct economic incentive.  The greatest MBI potential here 
lies in more tightly linking payments with performance, as in the NSW load based 
licensing scheme. 
 
Trading Markets: This strategy is found in the upper right corner, where regulation 
and market instruments are combined to create a market for an environmental good 
(or bad).  The basis for trading environmental commodities is a regulatory 
proscription of behaviour followed by regulatory permission of the behaviour under 
controlled conditions.  In establishing a market, the government first creates a new 
form of property - legal entitlements to emit pollutants, catch fish, develop habitat - 
and then imposes a set of rules governing their exchange. All trading programs 
therefore take place within carefully constructed markets. Absent legal restrictions on 
pollutant emissions, fish landings, or wetlands development, and the creation of 
alienable entitlements to these activities, few if any trades would take place. Put 
another way, one cannot move directly from the left (either from tax/subsidy schemes 
or open access) to the upper right part of the graph.  One must set in place prescriptive 
regulations before creating a trading market for the simple reason that regulations 
create the demand from which scarcity flows. 
 
4.3  Matching scale, scope and capacity 
 
Policy is not only generated within existing rules, regulations and customs but also 
within constraints and opportunities provided through existing political structures, 
biophysical constraints and physical, financial and social capitals.  Thus one must 
consider these contextual attributes in assessing whether the policy opportunity and 
the policy instrument can be adapted to achieve the desired outcome.   
 
As a two-dimensional example of the trade-offs involved, consider the political and 
biophysical constraints trade-offs shown in Figure 4.2.  The ‘line of opportunity’ 
shows where political structures and the physical extent of the ecosystem services 
under consideration are aligned.  Hence, the ‘best bets’ for regionally or locally driven 
MBIs that are the focus of this research will be located in the shaded area.  As an 
example, consider management of the service of water purification.  The biophysical 
scale is the watershed.  If, as in most cases, the political authority over land use exists 
at a smaller scale (such as cities and towns within the watershed), then management 
will be made difficult by the transaction costs of reaching agreement among these  
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authorities.  If there are no local authorities and the political power rests at a national 
or state level, management might be easier but the problem will be one of focus, as 
parties vie for the attention and resources of the central body.  Success will be most 
likely where the political boundaries track the watershed boundaries, as is the case to 
some extent in catchment management authorities in Victoria and New South Wales. 
 
Figure 4.2: Matching geographic and political opportunity 
 
Similar lines of opportunity can be drawn for trade-offs between other contextual 
attributes and a zone of ‘best bet’ opportunities can be conceived in a multi-
dimensional space.  Opportunities that lie outside the ‘best bets’ zone will have higher 
transaction costs associated with MBI development but may remain viable if the 
target ecosystem service is sufficiently valuable.  For example, despite global 
warming being an international problem, a sub-set of the international community is 
currently pursuing an independent solution (with associated transaction costs likely to 
be higher). 
 
The success of MBIs at the local or regional scale is likely to be particularly 
dependent on trade-offs involving local capacity and willingness to participate (which 
may be interrelated).  The costs involved in overcoming local opposition to MBI 
solutions may be large, particularly if the community is not ready to trial new 
solutions.  Furthermore, costs involved in overcoming such opposition can be viewed 
as dead-weight losses because they do not directly contribute to the institutions 
required to facilitate MBIs such as definition and measurement of property rights 
(which can be viewed as investments in institutional capital).  Local community 
capacity constraints can also be critical where they lead to poorly managed or flawed 
MBI solutions and desired outcomes are not achieved. 
 
4.4  MBI opportunity matrix 
 
Combining the conceptual framework discussed in section 3 with the application 
issues discussed in previous parts of section 4 yields an opportunity matrix such as 
that shown in Figure 4.3.  The opportunity matrix allows potential MBI opportunities 






National  Regional  Local  International 
Best bets  
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‘low hanging fruit’ opportunities for further research in an environment of limited 
resources.   
 
Figure 4.3: MBI opportunity matrix 
 














5.  ‘Best bet’ MBI opportunities 
 
The ‘Markets for ecosystem services’ project is currently being undertaken in three 
case study regions: 
·  The Goulburn-Broken Catchment in Victoria; 
·  The Murrumbidgee Catchment in New South Wales; and, 
·  The Blackwood Basin in Western Australia. 
In each of these regions the MBI opportunity matrix is being applied in conjunction 
with the case study partners to identify potential ‘best bet’ MBI opportunities.  
Several additional opportunities are also being considered within the boundaries of the 
project in collaborative arrangements with other researchers.   
 
While the process of identifying ‘best bet’ MBI options is not yet complete, the initial 
opportunities have been highly prioritised and are being further investigated.  In Table 
5.1 two ‘best bet’ MBI opportunities are described for each case study area including 
the location of the pilot, the ecosystem service being addressed and some important 
considerations in MBI selection and design. 
 
Several generalisations can be drawn from the ‘best bet’ options.  The biophysical 
information about the relationship between management and outcomes is a major 
deficiency in most cases with consequent uncertainty about potential outcomes.  
Information asymmetry is also a feature of many of the potential pilot opportunities.  
Identifying where these concerns preclude use of MBIs and the nature and cost of 
obtaining additional information will be an important aspect of the research 
undertaken in the ‘Markets for ecosystem services’ project. 
 
 
Based on criteria such as: 
impact/effectiveness/efficiency 
compared to current programs and 
value of ecosystem service(s). Table 5.1: Potential ‘Markets for Ecosystem Services’ pilot projects 
Location and target  Possible mechanism  Important considerations 
Goulburn-Broken Catchment  
Murrindindi Shire Council – 
targeting ecosystem services 
impaired by development on 
rural lands.   
Baseline and credit applying to specified 
impacts of rural development such as water 
quality and biodiversity impacts. 
·  Allowing offsets could increase flexibility in meeting goal of retaining services – especially 
if specialised 3
rd parties involved.  
·  Offset targets will be explicitly linked to regional targets thus integrating the MBI into a 
regional process. 
·  Offsets will induce increased transaction costs in the development application process could 
delay or reduce other benefits of development to the community – especially in competition 
with neighbouring shires. 
·  Difficult to define appropriate currencies. 
Mid-regions of Goulburn-
Broken catchment – 
targeting external salinity 
impacts of on-farm water 
management. 
Still being considered – must facilitate 
private sector contributions and likely 
government co-payment.  Likely to involve 
a combination of market structures such as 
an auction and annuities. 
·  There may be complex trade-offs between differing forms of market failure (for example 
differential discount rates and externalities) making identification of external impacts 
difficult. 
·  Only near viable management tool is deep-rooted perennial vegetation with highly uncertain 
long-term market outcomes. 
·  MBI will need to deal with significant information asymmetries relating to costs of 
abatement and outcomes from change. 
Murrumbidgee Catchment 
Coleambally Irrigation Area 
– targeting common 
property problem from 
irrigation induced salinity  
Cap and trade applying to net recharge of 
groundwater aquifers from irrigation. 
·  Uses scientific information to apply a point-source solution. 
·  Transaction costs of implementing and managing system may be high due to measurement 
and monitoring costs.   
·  Water market familiarity means lower transaction cost trading mechanism. 
·  Coupling with an offset framework would increase flexibility and may encourage innovation 
in net recharge management. 
Mid-regions of catchment – 
targeting external in-stream 
salinity impacts of on-farm 
water management. 
Still being considered – likely to involve a 
combination of market structures such as an 
auction and annuities. 
·  Known sub-catchment salt sources but increased complexity and costs to identify specific 
sites.   
·  MBI will need to deal with significant information asymmetries relating to costs of 
management change and outcomes from change. 
·  Spatial heterogeneity of salt sources means relatively few participants. 
·  Only near viable management tool is deep-rooted perennial vegetation with highly uncertain 
long-term market outcomes.  




Road infrastructure - 
targeting protection of road 
segments from salinity 
impacts. 
Baseline and credit via individual 
negotiated payments for desired 
management change. 
·  Can future salinity impacts be identified with sufficient certainty to facilitate protection 
measures being taken?   
·  What is the certainty associated with the protection measures? 
·  What is the cost of obtaining sufficiently detailed information? 
·  Mechanism design will need to take into account the significant costs of bilateral 
negotiations. 
Basin wide review of 
existing incentives to 
identify MBI opportunities 
Unknown – could involve a baseline and 
credit mechanism facilitated through an 
auction. 
·  How do MBI transaction costs compare with current allocation methods? 
·  Is sufficient information available to facilitate an MBI over an input subsidy or flat side-
payment? 
·  Is the market sufficiently large enough to facilitate a MBI solution? 
Other potential opportunities – indicative information provided only 
Desert Uplands (Central 
Qld) – corridor retention 
following clearing 
Multi-stage auction process likely to be 
combined with bilateral negotiations. 
·  Facilitated by the Desert Uplands Build-up and Development Committee in collaboration 
with QLD EPA, Central Queensland University and CSIRO. 
·  Critical issue is how to best manage bids whose values are in part dependent on 
neighbouring bid characteristics.   
·  Difficulty defining appropriate measures of biodiversity impact given information 
constraints. 
Fitzroy Basin Qld – 
Regulation/MBI tradeoffs in 
nutrient management  
Not an MBI as such but will provide 
information on how best to structure MBIs. 
·  Facilitated by The Central Queensland University in partnership with several regional 
organisations and CSIRO. 
·  What information is required to design an appropriate policy framework? 
·  At what combinations of regulation and participant heterogeneity do MBIs become the most 
efficient means of achieving specific outcomes? 
Location yet to be fixed – 
reducing market failure due 
to risk and knowledge gaps 
Fund to leverage private investments via an 
individual negotiation process. 
·  Facilitated by Greening Australia.  
·  Where do gaps between perceived and real risks occur? 
·  What is the availability of information about risks? 
·  How should risks be split for appropriate private management incentives? 6.  Conclusions  
 
Ecosystems produce a range of services that benefit individuals both directly and 
indirectly.  With few exceptions, though, these ecosystem services are neither prized 
by markets nor protected by the law because they have been taken for granted or are 
not amenable to market commodification.  Many potential markets for ecosystem 
services have not emerged in this environment because of the high transaction costs – 
particularly where many of the desirable institutional characteristics for creating 
markets are not met.  In particular the fixed or up-front costs of market creation which 
have public good attributes are a major obstacle to market creation.  Identifying ways 
of minimising these transaction costs is an important consideration in developing 
markets for ecosystem services. 
 
In this paper a framework for applying the concepts underpinning MBI creation at the 
regional level has been described.  The framework involves identifying the ‘best bets’ 
or ‘low hanging fruit’ to which MBI mechanisms may be suited.  These ‘best bets’ 
will be those ecosystem services that generate a high value to the community or a 
subset of the community.  They are likely to lie in a zone of opportunity determined 
by the trade-offs between political structures, biophysical constraints and physical, 
financial and social capital.  Finally, the characteristics of the ‘best bet’ ecosystem 
services will need to be such that other causes of market failure such as information 
asymmetries and inadequate biophysical information to link cause and effect can be 
overcome. 
 
A number of preliminary ‘best bet’ opportunities are identified in section 5 of this 
paper.  These opportunities have been selected based on the available information 
about ecosystem services in the target regions and discussions with partner 
community organisations.  The immediate steps in the ‘Markets for Ecosystem 
Services’ project are to: 
1.  gather additional information about the value and function of the targeted 
ecosystem services; 
2.  identify potential policy mechanisms available including market creation and 
other options; and,  
3.  develop potential MBI mechanisms to ‘proof of concept’ stage.  This phase 
will include identifying important sources of transaction costs and whether 
these are likely to be overcome at reasonable cost.  Funding to implement 
potential pilot projects that remain likely to succeed will then be sought.  
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